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The European Union (EU) is an alliance of 15 Westem European nations that
coordinate on economic, social, judicial, and political issues. In 1991, the EU decided to
begin collaboration among its members' foreign and security policies. The goal of a
common European military identity had been previously attempted by several EU
members, but with little success. The early 1990s Balkan crisis provided the EU with a
perfect opportunity to unite on a plan for concerted military action, yet the European
countries could not agree on how to address the situation. This failure highlighted the
EU's need to refine its decision-making process and work with an existing security
organization in order to accomplish its ambitious goal of military cooperation. By
examining past relations, present developments, and future plans between organizations,
it became obvious that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be the most likely
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The European Union (EU) is an alliance of 15 Western European countries that
coordinate on economic, political, social, and military issues. Each of these states is a
member of the European Union because it realizes the potential benefits of acting to-
gether as a unified Europe-international economic and political power and continental
stability. However, to achieve this unity, each country must sacrifice some degree ofna-
tional sovereignty and accept the jurisdiction of EU institutions, which cannot always
work in the best interest of all member countries.
One area of interstate coordination that has been particularly challenging for the
EU is the development of a common security and defense identity. Military cooperation
is such a sensitive issue because the military has traditionally existed for defending do-
mestic territory and ensuring the security of foreign involvements. Today, the EU is try-
ing to move beyond this nationalistic tradition and work together on creating effective
military institutions and policies to address common Western European security and for-
eign policy goals. Ambitions have been high, but results have been disappointing.
Fortunately, the EU has learned a lot from its failures at military collaboration,
such as its inaction during the early 1990s Balkan crisis. The European alliance is using
2those lessons to build new plans for future cooperation. Failure to deal with these mili-
tary disappointments, combined with the rapidly changing nature of domestic and inter-
national security, poses a serious threat to the credibility and autonomy of the European
Union in world affairs.
The post-Cold War era demands new strategies to deal with security threats.
Democratic states are no longer preoccupied with the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack and
are no longer guaranteed protection by NATO, 1 whose mission was to prevent the spread
of Soviet expansionism. Rather, new and more probable security concerns have been
given priority, such as unpredictable terrorist attacks and internal conflicts in areas like
sub-Saharan Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.
Compared to its enormous economic and politicalleverage,2 the EU has had little
military strength and strategy to deal with these new types of crises. This deficiency has
arisen out of a lack of member cooperation, agreement and unity, not a shortage of troops
or weapons. lfthe former obstacles can be overcome, the EU may one day have a formi-
dable military like that of its transatlantic ally, the United States.
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CHAPTER II
Evolution of the European Union
After the bloody conflict of World War II, the countries of Westem Europe rec-
ognized the need for increased European cooperation and interdependence to prevent fu-
ture wars among the European states. The European leaders of the time maintained the
optimistic idea that economic cooperation would eventually bring about political unity, as
well as economic prosperity. From this desire to collaborate emerged a number of purely
economic predecessors to the present day European Union and the ultimate goal of cre-
ating a "United States of Europe."
One of the earliest, and most successful, attempts at regional integration was the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was ratified in 1951 to ease trade
tariffs and subsidies on these two industrial products between Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, France, Italy and West Germany. The ECSC "was revolutionary in the
sense that France was offering to sacrifice a measure of national sovereignty in the inter-
est of building a new supranational authority that could end an old rivalry [between




The success of the ECSC in stimulating coal and steel trade encouraged the six
member states to agree to further integration. So, in 1957 the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) were established.
The goal of the Euratom Treaty was to create a common market for atomic energy. The
purpose of the EEC was to eventually allow unrestricted trade of all goods, not just in-
dustrial products, between the six members. It also permitted free movement of people
and capital among member states and created common economic policies and institu-
tions, such as the European Investment Bank (McCormick, 1996, 52). These goals are
strikingly similar to the current economic functions of the European Union.
Furthermore, the EEC established political bodies that were later adopted by the
EC, and the EU, to select and evaluate common procedures. The Council of Ministers
held power over decision-making; the Commission implemented and oversaw policies;
the Parliamentary Assembly (later renamed as the European Parliament) watched over
the Commission; and a European Court of Justice interpreted and enforced treaty re-
quirements. These institutions reinforced the theory that economic collaboration can, and
will, lead to political alliances.
The effects of the European Economic Community were impressive. The liber-
alization of trade spurred industrial growth, and the political bodies fostered steady re-
gional communications. Other Western European countries became very interested in
EEC membership because they wanted to enjoy the benefits of free trade, or they feared
being excluded from the prosperity that integration was expected to generate. Ireland, the
United Kingdom, and Denmark were admitted in 1973, and by 1986, Greece, Spain and
Portugal were also members.
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The EEC eventually merged with the ECSC and Euratom to form the European
Community (EC). Although the EC had grown in membership since its creation in the
late 1950s, the economic conditions of Europe had stagnated. The common market had
not yet been completely implemented-some trade and travel barriers still existed in
Western Europe. Many believed that the common market would never happen without
further monetary integration. Therefore, a European Monetary System was enacted to
alleviate inflation and unemployment. This system established fixed exchange rates be-
tween EC member countries, with the hopes of one day replacing individual currencies
with a single European Currency Unit (more commonly known today as the euro). The
program would be controlled by a new European Central Bank, which still exists. Today,
it is actively monitoring the progress of the euro in its adoptee nations and is closely
watching the economies of those nations interested in the new currency.
In addition to striving for monetary union, the EC also took its final step towards
the common market by implementing the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The SEA
achieved complete openness among EC members by eliminating all barriers between EC
countries. The SEA was "widely acclaimed as the single most important and successful
step in the process of European integration"(McCormick, 1996, 71) since the creation of
the EEC in 1957. People and goods were allowed to move freely because customs and
passport regulations were removed. EC states coordinated laws and legal standards to
facilitate the free movement of interstate economic investments and exchanges. In addi-
tion to unprecedented European assimilation, the SEA gained immense international
power for EC members by building the world's largest trading bloc and single economic
market.
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Treaty on European Union
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist threat in 1990 opened up EC
membership to the reunified former East Germany. The next major advancement to-
wards complete Western European unity was begun in December of that same year in the
Dutch city of Maastricht. There, the countries that made up the EC met at two intergov-
ernmental conferences (IGC), one on political union and one on economic union. At that
time, the regional coalition was still comprised of 12 Western European nations: France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. These governments drafted the Maastricht
Treaty, which was finalized in December of 1991 and eventually signed in February of
1992. This document, more commonly known as the Treaty on European Union, offi-
cially created the European Union and its present day structure.
This monumental treaty called for the creation of new political bodies and the of-
ficial renaming of the European alliance from its previous title, the European Commu-
nity. The European Union (ED) was divided into three "pillars," each with a different set
of responsibilities and level of authority. Although the pillar organization was a new in-
novation, the goals of the separate EU branches had previously been attempted by the
member nations.
The pillar known as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) was established to facilitate
cooperation among EU states on various legal issues. JHA expands upon the legal stan-
dardizations accomplished by the SEA. The areas addressed by JHA are considered to be
of common interest to all members: border crossing, immigration, combating drug smug-




police cooperation, and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal affairs (Anderson,
1994). JHA is essentially based on intergovernmental cooperation and is not a suprana-
tional institution. This means that JHA does not have sovereign decision-making author-
ity. It must obtain the unanimous support of all member countries before creating laws or
issuing legal sentences. Reliance on common agreement can make decision-making and
policy implementation slow, tedious, and sometimes ineffectual.
The most commonly known pillar of the EU is the European Monetary Union
(EMU). The goal of this agreement is to maintain unity between Western Europe's
economies and implement a single currency for the ED. The EMU redefined the role of
the European Central Bank and created minimum economic requirements for member
countries interested in adopting the European Currency Unit (ECU), popularly known as
the euro. So far, 12 of the current 15 EU members have adopted the euro. Since 1 Janu-
ary 1999, these countries have been using the common currency for inter-state payments
and business-to-business exchanges. The euro will be released for public circulation on 1
January 2002 (European Union, 1998). It is expected to stabilize Western Europe's
weaker economies and stimulate cross-border investments.
The idea of European Monetary Union was not new to the drafters of the Maas-
tricht Treaty. Uniting Europe economically has historically been at the forefront of
Western European cooperation. The European Coal and Steel Community, the European
Economic Community, the European Monetary System, and the Single European Act all
attempted economic cooperation and unity. These numerous mechanisms of economic
integration helped to establish the many prerequisites for a single currency: a single mar-
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ket, institutions to coordinate separate economies, and strong national commitments to
economic cooperation and interdependence.
The final pillar of the EU is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
This section of the Maastricht Treaty, Title Y, was drafted to establish two related, yet
separate, objectives-- a single foreign policy for all EU countries and military cooperation
among members to protect the future security of Western Europe. Developing the first
goal of a single foreign policy means conducting consistent relations with foreign coun-
tries. This is central to the international power of the EU because the coalition's eco-
nomic and political leverage is only powerful when unified. For example, all EU
members should ideally come to a consensus on how to conduct economic, as well as
diplomatic, relations with the United States. If some countries are not in agreement with
others on how to trade and negotiate with the US, the US could get exactly what it wants
by playing these differences against disagreeing EU states. Although the EU generally
agrees on external economic relations, they have not had similar success in coordinating
political relations. An informative pamphlet on the CFSP published by the Council of the
European Union clearly expresses the EU's position on foreign policy. "The European
Union ... must be able to speak with one voice and show a common political
will"(Council, 1999, 10)
The second goal of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is the creation of a
European security and defense identity (ESDI) and is only possible if the first goal has
been realized. The ESDI is a dynamic issue that encompasses the possible formation of
EU military troops; the need to coordinate with NATO (whose membership includes
many, but not all, EU states); and the creation of effective institutions to quickly deploy
IL
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troops to appropriate armed conflicts. Of the three ED pillars, the CFSP, and more spe-
cifically the ESDI, has been the least successful. Past attempts at military coordination
by the European alliance have been unfruitful, and even embarrassing.
European Defense Community
The Pleven Plan of 1950 initiated the first European attempt at military coordina-
tion. The members of the ECSC (Benelux,3 France, West Germany, and Italy) negotiated
this proposal for 2 years before signing it. The Pleven Plan became the European De-
fense Community (EDC). According to Winston Churchill, the goal of the EDC was to
create a common European defense through '''a European Army tied to [the] political in-
stitutions of a united Europe [and a] European Minister for Defense"'(McCormick, 1996,
51). This effort was designed to strengthen Western Europe's military potential against
the nearby escalation of Soviet power and would hopefully tie Western Germany into a
military alliance to detect and prevent Nazi resurgence.
The objectives of the EDC could have been very beneficial to Europe, but there
were many faults in how it was implemented. First of all, it was too supranational in na-
ture-the Army held autonomous power to mobilize without direct authorization from all
six member countries. The absence of unanimous consent requirements threatened the
sovereignty of individual states. They feared that the common military forces, to which
they contributed national resources, could be utilized even if the assignment was not in
every nation's best interest. Secondly, World War II suspicions still lingered between
affiliates. For instance, the "thought of placing French troops under foreign command or
the rearming of Germany faced too much opp.osition in the French Parliament"(Eliassen,
..
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1998,3). Furthermore, the EDC also did not devote enough effort to formulating a basic
common foreign policy. All six states could never approve a military undertaking against
a foreign power unless they first agreed upon their relationship with that country or re-
gime. Finally, the EDC excluded Britain, which had Europe's most powerful post-WWII
military and was essential for European military strength. In the end, the EDC plan was
abolished when the French Parliament eventually rejected it in 1954. This ambitious,
failed attempt at military coordination taught the EC that common defense depends on
many preparatory steps and the trust of all participating governments.
The Maastricht Treaty provision on the CFSP takes into consideration the lessons
learned from the deficiencies of the EDC. The treaty created the CFSP as a forum for
intergovernmental cooperation, not an institution with supranational powers. The re-
quirement for undivided approval of security affairs is intended to reduce national con-
cerns that a plan of action could be decided and acted upon even if it was detrimental to
one or more member states. This safeguard also reduces the likelihood that national
troops could be placed under the command of an antagonistic or domineering member.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy was drafted at the 1991 IGC as a two-
step process. First, a common foreign policy must be established and followed. Then,
from this commonality an ESDI can emerge. The Maastricht Treaty recognized that once
a standard foreign policy is unanimously accepted and adopted, defense negotiations
could take place. Consensus on how defense should be managed, worded as "a common
defense policy" in Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, must also precede actual military
mobilization, technically termed "common defense." The ED is in transition between
these two stages as it realizes that it needs its own rapid reaction troops to do peacekeep-
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ing abroad, but is still years away from having them in operation (Associated Press,
2000A).
Recent Failures
Another, more recent, failed attempt at Western European defense collaboration
took place after the break up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (around the same time the
EU decided to adopt the CFSP). From 1991 to 1992 the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared independence, leaving a
Yugoslavia that consisted only of the remaining republics of Montenegro and Serbia.
Serbia strongly opposed the Croatian and Bosnian secessions, so violence erupted be-
tween ethnic Bosnian, Croat, and Serb populations.
As war waged between Croatia and Serbia in 1991, and betweens Serbs and [Bos-
nian] Muslims in 1992, the West was compelled to confront a number of issues,
including interstate and intrastate war on Europe's immediate periphery; signifi-
cant casualties and genocidal murder; brutal human rights violations including
systematic rape; vast numbers of refugees; and economic upheaval. (Rupp,
1998A, 159)
The world perceived this as the perfect opportunity for the EU to finally unite on
a proposal for reestablishing peace on their home continent and show that it was more
than merely an economic power, but the Union failed to do so. It engaged in diplomatic
efforts to bring about Balkan peace, such as submitting cease-fires and peace plans, "and
then employed the full gamut of negative economic measures [including sanctions]
against the former Yugoslavia, yet it could not coerce the parties into reaching an agree-
ment"(Smith, 1998, 78). The EU needed to do more to quell the crisis~deploy military
force.
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The option of force was not effectively executed for several reasons. Primarily,
the members of the EU could not agree upon a single plan of action because national in-
terests still dominated the decision-making process. For example, the British wanted the
US to lead any initiative in the Balkans; France supported a purely European military en-
gagement to prove its international strength; Germany opposed using national troops in
out-of-area humanitarian efforts; and Denmark was entirely anti-militaristic about the
whole situation. All EU members must accept any CFSP action, and this naturally makes
crisis response slow moving.
Moreover, the EU had not been involved in serious military operations for dec-
ades and was extremely tepid in exercising the use of force out of a fear of causing Euro-
pean casualties, especially because the situation was not viewed as a direct threat to
European security. The EU did ask the Western European Union, a European military
alliance, to prepare a plan for eventual deployment of peacekeeping troops, with options
ranging from limited intervention to full-scale peacemaking. But, two preconditions for
intervention were attached to the request-a cease-fire must exist and the security of the
troops needed to be guaranteed (Jorgensen, 1993, 83). These were completely unattain-
able requirements for military involvement because if these conditions could have been
secured, there would have been little need for peacekeeping in the first place.
Finally, the military capacity of the EU was not necessarily strong enough to have
any real effects without UN or NATO assistance. Although individual member countries
controlled formidable militaries, the EU itself possessed "no airlift capacity, no inde-
pendent intelligence collection or surveillance capability, limited combat air force capa-
t'
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bility, command, and control, and no troops trained for rapid intervention"(Dean, 1994,
282).
Overall, the European Union was completely ineffective in dealing with the crisis
in the former Yugoslavia, and the situation was ultimately dealt with by the US and
NATO. "In the end, it was NATO that finally brought the warring parties to the bar-
gaining table after unleashing a punishing bombardment upon Serb forces in fall
1995"(Rupp, 1998A, 170). NATO had originally tried to avoid involvement in the Bal-
kans because the United States believed the situation would inevitably entail the use of
US troops, but the EU's inaction left no other option. A statement by Oregon Senator
Gordon Smith before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations captures the humiliat-
ing nature of this incident. He asserts that the experience in the Balkans "highlights the
inability of the EU to act together on matters of foreign and security policy"(United
States, 1999, 2).
The EU not only failed to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. It failed to es-
tablish its military independence from the United States, which is the single largest con-
tributor to NATO operations. Western Europe has relied on US military assistance
throughout the twentieth century, and some European states are eager to break that de-
pendency to become a self-sustaining, formidable world power. This entails political and
military credibility, as well as economic.
Despite inevitable embarrassment due to their failure, the EU's unsuccessful at-
tempts to moderate the war in the Balkans presented the EU with an opportunity to learn
a lot about the CFSP and its shortcomings. It became obvious that the CFSP's reliance
on unanimity needed modification because it lengthened the decision-making process so
------_._- - -_._._._._..
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much that it was nearly impossible to react effectively to any crisis situation. Some
countries like Ireland and Sweden favor neutrality, whereas more forceful countries such
as France and Britain do not always agree on how to intervene abroad. The EU also re-
alized that it desperately needed to build institutions that specialize in monitoring and ad-
dressing crisis situations before they escalate too far. Furthermore, the EU recognized
the importance ofEU troops that would not hesitate to utilize force when necessary.
Such forces must be competent, loyal, and prepared for rapid mobilization. These lessons
provided the basis for amendments to Title V of the Treaty on European Union at the
1996 IGC on political union.
Amsterdam Treaty
In 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU, finally bringing the alliance
to its current membership of 15 states.4 All 15 nations convened at the 1996 IGC to make
amendments to the Maastricht Treaty in an effort to improve the efficiency of EU opera-
tions. The final product was the Amsterdam Treaty.
Reforming the CFSP was a top priority, given the recent Yugoslav crisis. Such
massive violence had not taken place in Europe for many decades; so naturally, the EU
was caught off guard and was unprepared to be ofmuch assistance. Whatever the ex-
cuse, the EU was determined to further develop its united military capacity to ensure such
humiliation never happened again.
To further improve military coordination, the Amsterdam Treaty created another
foreign policy instrument, called the common strategy. This new mechanism for policy
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coordination was added to the two foreign policy instruments created by the Treaty on
European Union: "common positions" and "joint actions".
Common positions are the first step towards a common foreign policy. The Euro-
pean Council5 unanimously defines a common position, and the national policies of every
member state must conform to the position. For example, if the Council decides that the
EU is going to cut off diplomatic relations with Iraq, each member must take all possible
actions to suspend Iraqi political contact. Common positions were designed to make co-
operation more systematic and synchronized.
Once common positions are in place, joint actions can be adopted. The European
Council issues joint actions to coordinate resources from all member states (human re-
sources, expertise, financing, equipment, etc.) in order to attain specific objectives in ar-
eas where action is deemed to be required. Joint actions identify general and specific
goals, intended duration, and the anticipated means for achieving those objectives. For
example, in 1991 the Council decided to implement ajoint action in the Western Balkans
to gather and analyze information to facilitate the effective formulation of a European
Union foreign policy towards the Balkans. The result was the European Community
Monitor Mission (ECMM). The ECMM was created with certain objectives in mind, was
reviewed and extended in December 2000, and is supported by the resources of all EU
states (Council, 2001).
Common strategies, however, are only to be implemented in areas where all
member states have strategic interests. Like joint actions, common strategies set out the
aims and length of time covered by the plan of action and the means to be made available
by the Union and member states to implement and maintain it. The difference, however,
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is that common strategies are more specifically intended for strategic military interven-
tion, whereas joint actions are a catch all for any type of coordinated action abroad. The
purpose of creating this distinction between joint actions and common strategies is so the
ED will more readily realize when an issue is of common strategic importance and, there-
fore, deserves more serious consideration ofmilitary intervention.
The Amsterdam Treaty also revolutionized CFSP decision-making by establishing
"constructive abstention." Members can now merely abstain from, instead of veto, poli-
cies they do not agree with. This vote of constructive abstention means that the abstain-
ing state does not need to participate in the policy, but those who support it can contribute
to its implementation. This mechanism does not apply, however, when abstentions ac-
count for more than one-third of Council votes (i.e. 25 weighted votes).
Decision-making within the security and defense field was also eased by the ex-
tension ofmajority voting in areas where unanimity was previously required. The re-
vised Article J.13 of the Treaty specifies the different CFSP decisions and which type of
voting requirements each utilizes.
When the European Council adopts principles, guidelines, and common strategies
the rule is unanimity with the possibility of constructive abstention. When the
Council adopts joint actions, common positions, or implementing decisions on the
basis of previously agreed common strategies, joint actions or common positions,
the rule is qualified majority except when a state objects, citing important reasons
ofnational policy. (Gourlay, 1998, 82)
The ED hoped that these changes would improve the decision-making process and pre-
vent interstate gridlock, like that which arose when trying to decide on how to deal with
the Balkan crisis.
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The 1996 IGC established important positions and institutions that would further
contribute to a cohesive European security policy. The post of High Representative for
the CFSP was created and bestowed upon the Secretary-General of the Council of the
European Union to give the issue a higher profile and ensure its coherence (European
Union, 2000A). The primary responsibility of this position is to assist the Council in for-
eign and security policy issues by preparing proposals and implementing decisions re-
lated to the CFSP. The High Representative is also expected to work with the Council
President in conducting political dialogue with third parties. In 1999, this title was given
to Mr. Javier Solana Madariaga, fonner NATO Secretary-General.
A declaration annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty established a "policy planning
and early warning unit" as a tool of the CFSP. The High Representative for the CFSP is
in charge of the policy planning and early warning unit (PPU) and is supported by the
unit's accomplishments. The main duties of the specialists who constitute the PPU are to
monitor continuously any world events that are relevant to the security of Western
Europe; report on situations that may escalate into political crises and require EU diplo-
matic or military action; generate policy-option papers to help fonnulate foreign and se-
curity policies; and assess general EU interests and areas for future CFSP involvement.
The creation of the PPU and the CFSP Representative position are pivotal devel-
opments in the eventual creation of a European security and defense identity. The draft-
ers of the Amsterdam Treaty were very wise to realize that a policy as difficult as the
CFSP can only succeed if it has its own leaders and institutions that specialize in and are
dedicated to the ultimate goal of concerted military action. An EU publication assessing
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the developments of the Amsterdam Treaty states the centrality of the PPU in another
light.
The coherence of common foreign and security policy depends on how Member
States react to international developments. Past experience [like the Balkan con-
flict] has shown that if reactions are uncoordinated, the position of the European
Union and its Member States on the international scene is weakened. Joint analy-
sis of international issues and their impact, and pooling of information should
help the Union produce effective reactions to international developments. (Euro-
pean Union, 2000A)
The four previously mentioned CFSP reforms-adding conlllon strategies,
changing voting requirements, creating the High Representative for the CFSP, and estab-
1ishing the PPD-all deal with improving the efficiency of foreign and security policy
making. The Amsterdam Treaty also redefined how policies should actually be imp1e-
mented. It accomplished this by strengthening ties to the military alliance known as the
Western European Union.
Western European Union
When the European Defense Community collapsed in 1954, the Brussels Treaty,
which created the initiative, was amended to establish a new alliance for coordinating de-
fense policies-the Western European Union (WEU). At that time, the WED consisted
of the six EDC members (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, West Ger-
many, and Italy) and Britain. Whereas the EDC aspired to create a European army, the
WEU intended to build military commitments between member countries. The WEU
required all members to provide all possible military aid and assistance to any member
that came under attack in Europe (Dean, 1994, 266). Furthermore, the WED "was an at-
...
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tempt to help Germany contribute to the defense of Western Europe without taking part
in the kind of European army envisioned by the EDC"(McCormick, 1996,283).
Several years before the creation of the WEU, in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty
was signed between the US, Canada, and several Western European nations6 to restore
and maintain security in the post-WWII North Atlantic region. Several years later, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into existence as a structure for mili-
tary cooperation between those countries. Its primary purpose was to deter and counter
communist threats to the Western world. NATO soon overshadowed the WEU as the
main non-communist security alliance of the Cold War. This is due, in part, to NATO's
larger membership, which granted it expanded access to military assets, and strong or-
ganizationalleadership by the United States.
Therefore, for the next thirty years the WEU lay dormant, referred to by some as a
"reserve institution." "As one diplomat put it, the WEU became 'a place where you
found jobs for retired Italian admirals"'(McCormick, 1996,283). In 1984, however,
President Ronald Reagan's plan to build a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), more
popularly known as "Star Wars," revived the European military group. The SDI was
supposed to protect the United States physically against nuclear weapons by creating a
space-orbiting system to detect and shoot down any long-range missiles fired at US ter-
ritory. Europeans feared that America would hide behind this defense system and fail to
keep its NATO commitments to protect Western Europe in case of a communist attack
(Dean, 1994, 267). Although the SDI never successfully materialized, the WEU had
been resuscitated. It continued to grow more cohesive and ambitious, despite US and
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NATO warnings against any collective defense plans outside of the North Atlantic alli-
ance.
The reinvigorated Western European Union was detennined to create a European
security and defense identity separate from NATO and the control of the US. France and
Gennany were at the forefront of this initiative, ultimately seeking greater European
autonomy. From this desire emerged the Hague "Platfonn on European Security Inter-
ests," which redefined the WEU's new purpose and responsibilities. This document,
which was written in 1987, outlined two essential roles for the WEU-"to provide
Europe's security identity, and to serve as a bridge between NATO and the European
Community"(McKenzie, 1998, 103) [the official EU title was not created until 1991].
Many WEU members believed the organization was finally clearly defined and
was, therefore, prepared to play an active role in representing Western Europe in interna-
tional conflicts. Optimism was high that the European Community had finally estab-
lished its own defense pillar after decades of failed experiments and dependence on the
US military. The WEU's successful coordination of member states' forces during a
minesweeping mission in the Persian Gulf area during the 1987 Iran-Iraq War further re-
inforced this confidence (MeConnick, 1996,283).
At the time, the memberships of the WEU and the EC (now known as the EU)
were very similar. By 1988, the WEU was composed of its original seven members, and
Spain and Portugal. The EC included all WEU member states, plus Ireland, Greece and
Denmark. The striking similarity in membership caused the EC to consider incorporating
the WEU into the economic alliance.
Te
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So, at the 1991 IGC the WEU was written into Article J.3 of the Maastricht
Treaty as "an integral part of the development of the Union [which would] elaborate and
implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implica-
tions"(European Union, 2000C). The Maastricht Treaty had finally linked the WEU and
the EU, and membership between the two groups became even more similar. Greece
joined the WEU as its tenth full member, and Denmark and Ireland were admitted to the
WEU with observer status. Although the WEU seemed perfectly suited to serve as the
EU's defense pillar, many problems remained.
First of all, the EU did not completely trust the WEU to undertake full-scale
military operations. The Balkan crisis provided an excellent opportunity for the EU to
finally utilize the WEU for security measures. However, when Sarajevo, the capital of
Bosnia, was in need of protection, the WEU was not called upon to assist. A meeting of
the North Atlantic Council? was convened instead. "This may be attributable to the com-
plexity and immediacy of the problem, but it did nothing to strengthen the CFSP or the
commitment to develop a common defense"(McKenzie, 1998, 104) under the auspices of
the WEU.
Also, the WEU's two roles-as Europe's security identity and as the link between
the EU and NATO-remained unchanged under the CFSP provision of the Treaty on
European Union. The WEU was to serve as the defense arm of the EU, yet it was also to
strengthen the European pillar of NATO. This duality, often called the "hinge principle,"
made the organization "uncertain of its central role and still unclear about its substantive
relationship to both the EU and NATO"(Rhodes, 1998,60).
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Neither of the two functions of the WEU could have been eliminated, however,
because they represent opposing views over the implementation of a common European
defense. As previously mentioned, France and Germany support the WEU as the primary
organization for military cooperation in Europe. Britain, on the other hand, is an Atlanti-
cist and has very strong ties to the United States. It will only support NATO as the col-
lective defense organism for Western Europe. Because each of these very powerful
nations is also a member of all three organizations, all of their opinions must be re-
spected, even if they make an ESDI impossible.
Furthermore, NATO was still a strong force in 1991, despite the end of the Cold
War and the insecurity that surrounded its future role. Some expected NATO to disband
with the fall of the Soviet Union and saw the WEU as its replacement; this was not a re-
alistic option.
Reasons for this can be found in the European inability, either through the WEU
or CFSP to resolve the Bosnia conflict; disagreements over the strengthening of
the WEU in order to take on NATO-like missions; and differences between Brit-
ain and France in their assessment of the future of either Russia or Germany, as
well as the continued role of the US in Europe. (Kirchner, 1999,47)
Instead, NATO persevered and began to redefine its role in world pOlitics-it was no
longer for containing communism, but instead became a mechanism for quelling conflicts
in areas of strategic importance. This new duty came in direct conflict with the evolving
role of the WEU, as defined at the 1992 St. Petersberg summit.
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Petersberg Tasks
Two weeks after NATO announced that it would make its troops available for
peacekeeping under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the
WEU Council of defense and foreign ministers assembled in Petersberg, Germany.
There, the WEU "declared its own willingness to participate in peacekeeping of the
CSCE or the UN"(Dean, 1994,276). The "Petersberg tasks" are the types of humanitar-
ian activities that the WEU agreed to undertake: peace maintenance, crisis management,
and humanitarian aid. Many governments, especially the US, feared that this would cre-
ate an unnecessary duplication of efforts and create a competitive relationship between
NATO and the WED.
At the Petersberg summit, the WEU also outlined the procedures for appointing
member state forces to certain conflicts, both within and outside of Europe. The WEU
even created a planning cell, "which would deal with command, control and communica-
tions arrangements for operational missions and prepare contingency plans for opera-
tions. Under these arrangements the WEU will be activated only for specific
purposes"(Kirchner, 1999,48), rather than act as a standing European army like that
originally attempted by the EDC in 1952.
In order to more clearly define its expected role in international security, the EU
included the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty's revision of Title V of the Maas-
tricht Treaty. The governments of the EU incorporated peacekeeping and humanitarian
intervention into the developing ESDI because they recognized the decline in the occur-
rence of large-scale wars, like the world wars of the 20th century. They realized that the
majority of European security threats were likely to result from internal wars in nearby
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areas, such as the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Israel. Therefore, an effective ESDI
would not be complete without developing a method to deal with these conflicts.
The 1996 IGC did succeed at outlining EU procedures for out-of-area involve-
ment, but it failed to substantiate several other defense developments that many countries
had strongly pushed for to expedite the CFSP process. Most importantly, ties between
the WEU and the EU were not redefined, but simply reiterated.
Greece, Germany, Belgium, Austria, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain fa-
vored making the WEU an EU institution (Gourlay, 1998,63-65). These member states
supported an ESDI separate from NATO and saw the integration of the WEU as the most
probable means of doing so. They maintained the idea that bringing the WEU under the
control of the EU would not only make military action more efficient, but it would also
bolster trust between the two entities. Because the seven other members opposed this
proposal, no progressive changes were solidified. Article J. 7.1 now ambiguously calls
for "closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the inte-
gration of the WEU into the Union." As in the past, the EU was prevented from moving
forward in the development of an autonomous security and defense identity because of its




In December of 1999, the members of the European Union met in Helsinki to dis-
cuss putting the Petersberg tasks into action. The result of this summit was a plan to de-
velop a rapid reaction force (RRF) by 2003 with the ability to deploy up to 60,000 troops
within 60 days to an area of conflict. Those troops would be sustained for up to a year
and then replaced by another force if necessary, therefore requiring a pool of over
180,000 to 230,000 total troops. This decision came soon after Javier Solana's appoint-
ment to the new position of the High Representative for the CFSP.
The push was [also] accelerated by the European allies' realization during this
year's NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo that they had nothing like the ability
of the United States to move hundreds of fighter-bombers to the theater of opera-
tions, use sophisticated satellite technology to guide bombs to their targets, and
neutralize Serbian antiaircraft defenses-even though the conflict was less than an
hour's flying time from their own territories. (Whitney, 1999B)
Less than one year later, by November of2000, the RRF had made impressive
advancements. The force was already placed under the command of German Lt. Gen.
Klaus Schuwirth (Reuters, 2000A). It had received pledges of over 100,000 troops, 400
combat aircraft, and 100 ships from EU states. Many non-EU countries had also ex-
pressed interest in being associated with the force and were formulating how many men
'F
26
and weapons they would contribute (Associated Press, 2000B). Even Russia suppOlied
the plan and "was ready to cooperate with the European Union's new military
force"(Reuters,2000B). Finally, the European community had come to an agreement on
the creation of a real security initiative. Its goals were clear, it held continent-wide sup-
port, and its construction was well under way.
Unfortunately, the US and NATO were not as enthusiastic. The purpose of the
RRF is intervention in foreign conflicts that are of particular interest to the force's con-
tributing members. This role is very similar to that of post-Cold War NATO. So natu-
rally, NATO began to feel very threatened by this new European effort. "NATO
Secretary-General Lord Robertson warned ... that any rivalry between the established
trans-Atlantic alliance and a nascent European-only reaction force could be disastrous for
both"(Associated Press, 2000B). This rivalry could develop for several reasons. The
RRF could "waste" valuable European military assets that would otherwise be used for
NATO operations; and, it could create competing military structures that would prevent
both the US and the EU from responding coherently to international crises.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has summed up US concerns about the plan
with what she calls "the three D's": The European defense initiative must not
"decouple" the United States from Europe; it must not "duplicate" NATO struc-
tures and capabilities; and it must not "discriminate" against NATO members that
do not belong to the ED. (Drozdiak, 2000)
The first of these concerns, that the RRF will divide the transatlantic partnership,
"has stupefied Europeans. After clamoring for Europe to take control of its own security,
the United States suddenly seems fearful that the Helsinki plan could jeopardize NATO
and US leadership of the alliance"(Drozdiak, 2000). In order to prevent irreparable dam-
age, the European Union has been working very diligently to assure the US and other
r
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non-EU NATO members that the RRF is in the best interest of NATO. The Union stands
finnly behind the idea that the RRF will strengthen the European pillar of NATO, thereby
freeing the US from the heavy burden of supporting Europe militarily. French Defense
Minister Alain Richard epitomizes this sentiment by stating that "a strengthening of the
Europeans' own capabilities would modernize, and adjust the balance of, the [North At-
lanticJ alliance"(Isnard, 2000).
With respect to the concerns over the duplication ofNATO, Javier Solana, also
known as Mr. CFSP, has repeatedly stated that the RRF "will not in any way undermine
the role ofNATO"(Madariaga, 1999). The force will only be utilized in situations where
NATO as a whole does not want to become involved in crisis management. For example,
US President George W. Bush has expressed reservations about continued NATO pres-
ence in the fonner Yugoslavia. If the RRF were already operational, it would be a perfect
opportunity for the European force to take over the Balkan peacekeeping mission. This
alternative force could give NATO more flexibility over which conflicts to become in-
volved in and could relieve the heavy load that it currently maintains. Furthennore, the
EU is only trying to develop it own security forces. It will still primarily rely on national
troops, the WEU, and NATO for the defense of Europe.
Albright's third fear that the RRF will discriminate against non-EU NATO mem-
bers became obsolete when many non-EU European countries made military contribu-
tions to the new military force.
In addition to addressing the US's three main concerns, the EU has also taken
steps to ensure that NATO is an infonned and important part of the RRF process. First,
key NATO military personnel would be allowed pennanent seats or observer status on
T-
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the EU's most important military councils, including the permanent political and security
committee and the EU Military Committee (Castle, 2000). Second, NATO and the EU
are going to convene at six ambassadorial level meetings a year and at ministerial level
meetings at least once per year to ensure the maintenance of stability in the EU-NATO
relationship. This frequent meeting schedule makes rational sense given that the EU will
have access to some of NATO's assets for the functioning of the rapid reaction force-
most notably warning and control aircraft, communication networks, and intelligence gath-
ering satellites.
The thorough efforts of the European Union to convince the US and NATO that
the European security force would not be detrimental to the seasoned alliance did payoff.
The United States eventually cooled its opposition to the RRF and now endorses it, but
only as long as the EU force is less important than NATO. The following statement by
former Defense Secretary William Cohen exemplifies how the US has come full circle on
the RRF debate. '" Let me be clear on America's position," Cohen said. "We agree with
this goal-not grudgingly, not with resignation, but with whole hearted convic-
tion'" (Ulbrich, 2000).
Enlargement
The European Union addresses a wide variety of issues and consists of 15 mem-
bers because of the occurrence of deepening and widening. Deepening is the process of
developing closer ties between member states by coordinating on additional governmen-




economic integration. However, over time the Western European association deepened
to include collaboration on social, judicial and military affairs. Widening is the process
of expanding membership to new nations. Nearly half a century ago, the European Coal
and Steel Community was created between six countries. The ECSC eventually evolved
into the European Union, which was created in 1991 between 12 European nations and
currently comprises 15 members.
The debate over deepening versus widening can shed much light on the past fail-
ures of the EU and the present dilemmas it faces. An alliance wishing to extend its power
can undertake either course of action, but deciding to go forward with both processes si-
multaneously can be very problematic and stifling. Examination of the EU's failure to
react to the Balkan crisis illuminates the mutually exclusive nature of widening and deep-
ening. If the EU had fewer members and did not have to coordinate the opinions of so
many sovereign nations, it could have been more effective at coming to a consensus on
how to deal with the nearby war. On the other hand, if the EU had never attempted to
take on military coordination in the Balkans, it would have not have been internationally
embarrassed when it fell short of its goal.
The difficulties that the EU encountered in formulating a unanimously supported
military plan of action provided a valuable lesson about the delicate balance between
widening and deepening. Regrettably, the EU did not recognize that lesson and is cur-
rently planning a massive stage of membership enlargement. At a summit in December
of 2000, EU officials decided to begin the process of allowing 13 more countries8 into the
ED. These applicants will obtain full member status once their economies and legal sys-




the EU plans to solidify a common security and defense identity with 28 members, when
it can hardly do so with only 15, especially since the union is still "struggling with sys-
tems that were designed when it had only six member countries"(Daley, 2000).
The enlargement of the EU alone poses substantial obstacles to the effective de-
velopment of an ESDI. For instance, the challenge of consensus and majority voting re-
quirements will dramatically retard the EU's already slow decision-making process.
Furthermore, many of the nations being considered for membership are newly independ-
ent states that are struggling economically and have little military power of their own.
So, the EU's present members will be forced to provide a disproportional amount of sup-
port for any EU security forces. The 1995 average per capita defense budget for 10 of the
13 potential new EU members was only $61, compared with $442 for the EU 15
(Schleidt, 1996,248-249).
There are, however, several advantages to including new states in the EU and its
plans for an ESDI. First of all, the nations of the former Soviet Union could become a
productive link between the EU and Russia and could eventually help incorporate Russia
into the ESDI. Secondly, several states, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
Romania and Poland, all have peacekeeping experience that could prove valuable to the
developing rapid reaction force. Thirdly, the combined population of the 13 interested
countries is well over 100 million. This could help "reduce to some extent the manpower
problems of western countries with respect to peacekeeping"(Jopp, 1996, 80). This
situation would be especially constructive if the richer countries of Westem Europe




and benefits of widening the Western European alliance to include non-western countries,
it also must consider the concurrent enlargement of NATO.
NATO is also looking into further enlargement of its membership into Central and
Eastern Europe in order to adapt to post-Cold War politics. Since the fall of the USSR,
NATO has not only shifted its role in international politics to peacekeeping, but has also
begun to work with countries it was originally created to oppose. In 1994, NATO insti-
tuted the Partnership for Peace (PiP) program with countries from Central and Eastern
Europe. "The PiP facilitates closer and differentiated military cooperation between
NATO and the Partnership member states, in some cases with an eye towards eventual
membership"(Sperling, 1999, 11). The goal ofthe PiP was to establish political and
military stability in countries reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union and to create
Eastern European alliances that might prevent regional violence. PiP membership grew
to 27 (Kay, 1997, 169), and by 1999, three of the PiP members had received full NATO
membership: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Others may follow.
Following the end of the Cold War, NATO expanded more rapidly into Eastern
Europe than the EU, mainly because of the EU's strict membership requirements. The
EU's current enlargement endeavor is most likely an effort to catch up with NATO and
PiP membership in order to decrease the number ofnon-EU NATO countries, many of
which complain that the WEU9 and the RRF have access to NATO assets. The EU wid-
ening is also intended to ease the transition of newly independent states from communism






There is a strong theoretical argument for the development of an autonomous EU
security and defense identity. The EU is a formidable world power that should be able to
defend its own territory and ensure security in areas of strategic interest.
In 1992, even before contemplated expansion to include Norway, Finland, Swe-
den, and Austria, the EC states had a population of 345 million compared with
253 million for the United States, a gross domestic product of$6.9 trillion, $1
trillion more than the United States, expOlis of $565 billion compared to US ex-
ports of $448 billion, and armed forces of2.2 million compared to 1.9 million for
the United States. (Dean, 1994,277-278)
In reality, however, the EU has been completely ineffectual in creating a military
structure comparable to that of the US. This failure is largely attributable to the inherent
structure ofthe European Union-an association of sovereign states with differing na-
tional cultures, military loyalties, and attitudes towards out-of-area intervention. The
system ofEU decision-making has also stifled the effective formulation of security poli-
cies. The historical inability of the EU to solidify a CFSP also has to do with the Euro-
pean reliance on NATO and US forces. If NATO had disbanded with the collapse of
Soviet communism, Europe would have no longer been able to depend on its protection
and would have been forced to create its own means of interstate military cooperation.
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It is highly unlikely that the European Union will develop an ESDI in the near
future, at least without collaboration with an already-established security and defense or-
ganization. Besides the obstacles mentioned above, an independent EU military is hin-
dered by the many other obstacles-the EU's inexperience in coordinated military action;
its lack of effective intelligence gathering and mission command resources; the reluc-
tance of states to contribute to any EU forces when they already supply NATO's inte-
grated command structure; 10 and the fear that developing a system that resembles NATO
will sever longstanding transatlantic ties.
Developing an ESDI in conjunction with another association is very complicated
and requires the EU to establish and maintain reliable relations with their partner(s). This
entails a system for open communications, regularly scheduled meetings, clearly stated
common goals, delegated responsibilities, and a strong sense of mutual trust. Although
these prerequisites are tedious and challenging, history has shown that they are all neces-
sary because military cooperation is a delicate, difficult matter. The EU must take what it
has learned from its past failures and incorporate those lessons into its new, cooperative
undertakings. Only then can the EU achieve its goal, as spelled out by the EU's Com-
missioner for External Affairs, Christopher Patten. "What we're trying to do is make
sure the European voice is heard [in security affairs] at the same strong decibel level as
when the European Union speaks as the world's biggest trade bloc and the biggest for-
eign aid donor"(Whitney, 1999A).
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Collaboration with the OSCE
One potential partner for the EU's development of an ESDI is the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE, known as the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe until 1994, was created in 1975 as a forum for
encouraging cooperation among member states on a variety of specific issues, such as
technology, human rights and enviromnental protection (McCormick, 1996,279).
The UN established the OSCE as a regional security organization to deal with
early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.
The OSCE presently has 55 members, including the US, Canada, all of Western Europe,
the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Russia, a number of other Eastern European na-
tions, and a few countries from Central Asia. OSCE action requires participant consen-
sus on all matters, including preventive diplomacy, arms control, confidence- and
security-building measures, and safeguarding human rights.
The OSCE is a large and potentially effectual organization. It has successfully
executed several important security functions, most notably the facilitation of military
information sharing, conflict mediation, and the generation of ideas for the prosecution of
crisis management. Moreover, the OSCE's large, diverse membership has the potential
to bring about stable relations between old rivals. Russia strongly supports the organiza-
tion's existence and goals. Therefore, the OSCE theoretically has the power to bring
about positive change in Eastern Europe and facilitate military cooperation between the
West and the former Soviet Union (Bronstone, 2000, 72). This is an accomplishment that
NATO is very far from accomplishing, given Russia's vehement opposition to the Alli-
ance.
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Although the OSCE's role in crisis management, US-Russia reconciliation, and
European military coordination may grow and produce impressive results, the OSCE is
not the organization through which the EU will develop its security and defense identity.
The most significant reason for this is that the "OSCE has been more a series ofconfer-
ences than it is a real organization"(Snow, 1998, 155). It has a very small bureaucracy
and no military planning units for the EU to utilize. The OSCE was not created to per-
form military operations, but rather it specializes in "premilitary" or "soft" security ef-
forts. It leaves the function of assembling military contributions from member states to
the UN, NATO, and the WEU. In effect, the "the OSCE lacks any security guaran-
tee"(Clemens, 1999, 151) and has no experience in the type of force development and
deployment that the EU is seeking to carry out.
Even if the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe did develop its
own military units and engage in peacekeeping missions, several problems would still
prevent it from being an effective international tool. First, the consensus-voting require-
ment would make any military operation nearly impossible. The EU could not come to
an agreement over how to deal with the Balkan crisis, and it has only 15 members. Una-
nimity among 55 countries would be much more complex and paralytic. Secondly, there
is a shortage of funds available for OSCE operations. The present need for conflict pre-
vention and mediation is overwhelming, and the missions require financial support that
far exceeds the OSCE's budget (Dean, 1994,235). Without additional funding from
member countries, the organization's actions may be severely limited and ineffective at




The European Union should continue to work with the OSCE, doing what the or-
ganization does best-engaging in security-building measures and promoting military
policy sharing among members. The Union must look elsewhere for a partner to help
cultivate a common European security initiative. The OSCE has a positive, productive
role to play, as "a neutral agent, facilitating dialogue and negotiations among competing
parties"(Rupp, 1998B, 135), not as a coordinator of national armies and strategic inter-
ests.
Working with the WEU
Another possible way for the European Union to develop its ESDI is through
closer cooperation with the Western European Union. The WEU is a military alliance
between 10 of the EU's 15 member countries; the other five EU members hold WEU Ob-
server status. The two organizations not only share similar membership, but their histo-
ries are also closely connected. They are both manifestations of a desire to create
European interdependence, prosperity, and protection. Working with the WEU for secu-
rity and defense purposes would achieve the European goal of freedom from military de-
pendence on the United States.
With regards to future expansion, the WEU is a nearly perfect partner for the ED.
Iceland and Norway are the only two WEU associates ll that are not presently involved in
the EU or considering membership. Conversely, there are only two countries in the EU's
enlargement list that are not involved with the WEU: Cyprus and Malta. These incon-
sistencies are relatively small when EU membership is compared to that of NATO/PiP
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and the OSCE. Therefore, the EU could undergo its intended plan of enlargement and
still be closely related to the WEU in ternlS of membership. Another positive advantage
to working with the WEU is Russia's openness to the possibility of working with the EU
and the WEU on security and defense coordination. Collective European security should
not continue without the inclusion of Russia, and a EU-WEU affiliation could make that
a reality.
Working with the WEU, just like acting alone, makes theoretical sense for the
EU's development of an ESDI. Unfortunately, what should happen does not always ma-
terialize. The EU will still depend upon the WEU, as well as NATO, for the defense of
Europe. However, the EU will develop its security forces without the help of the West-
ern European Union. There are many reasons why the EU is undergoing the first real
step in developing its ESDI separate from the European military alliance.
The WEU was originally created as a pledge between members to contribute to
the defense of any member that came under attack, but this role has evolved over time.
In the early 1990s, the WEU adopted the Petersberg tasks, which would have allowed
military resources from members to be utilized for peacekeeping and humanitarian inter-
vention. When the EU decided to develop its rapid reaction force, the WEU abandoned
the Petersberg tasks, realizing they were more suited to the goals of the ED. Since then,
the WEU has decided to further limit its responsibilities to issues such as amlament re-
search and its original role of collective defense, therefore playing a negligible role in the
EU's exciting development of a rapid reaction force.
The EU has decided to carry out the Petersberg tasks with the help of NATO, in-
stead of the WEU, for several reasons. The idea of developing an RRF separate from the
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North Atlantic alliance was threatening to NATO and DS officials, and a break in trans-
atlantic ties could hurt not only diplomatic relations, but trade as well. Plus, NATO has
stronger institutions and more military assets than the WED that the RRF will have ac-
cess to.
Politically, the British would never have agreed to develop any security forces
without the auspices of NATO, and France probably realized that working under NATO
temporarily would pay off in the long run when the ED finally controlled its own inde-
pendent peacekeeping troops. The once popular idea of integrating the WED into the ED
would have made an ED-WED alliance more feasible for the formation of the RRF, but
the "WEU's integration in the European Union still seems remote and no timetable is
being envisaged for it"(Assembly, 1998, 14).
NATO also has much more experience than the WED at successfully executing
out-of-area missions, and will therefore, be a better example for the RRF to emulate.
When the concept of a Common Foreign and Security Policy was originally drafted into
the Maastricht Treaty, the governments ofthe ED agreed to rely on the WED for security
and defense applications. The fighting that erupted in the Balkans, following the frag-
mentation of the Yugoslavian state, should have been effectively dealt with by the WED
lmder an EU directive, but this never actualized. The EU could not agree upon a plan of
action for the WEU, so the warring continued. One reason for the failure of the ED and
the WED to act effectively, besides a lack of consensus and trust, was that neither alli-
ance had much practice in military coordination and mobilization. The WED had modest
successes in the Gulf War, but that was the limited extent of its experience.
39
The Western European Union, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, has a useful function and should continue to cooperate with the EU to accom-
plish those important security measures. Although the WEU has relinquished its crisis
management responsibilities in favor of the EU, it is taking the lead on European security
issues such as weapons trade and development, demining efforts, and maintaining the
"WEU Institute for Security Studies and the WEU Satellite Centre ... until the EU [has]
provided itself in 2002 with its own institute for security studies and its own satellite
centre"(WEU,2001). The WEU would have been a good RRF partner for the develop-
ment of an autonomous European force, but cooperation with NATO will make the force
more effective and enduring.
Continued NATO Dependence
The European Union has decided to work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation in the development of its rapid reaction force, the first major phase in the creation
of a European security and defense identity. The EU has many incentives for choosing
NATO as a partner. Several were specified in the previous section-fear of duplicating
NATO structures, NATO's familiarity with peacekeeping, and European political differ-
ences.
The Alliance has not always been completely effective in dealing with conflicts it
has been involved in, 12 but its track record for efficient decision-making and mobilization
is unparalleled. These are two essential functions that the RRF must master in order to
work. A rapid reaction force that does not react quickly, or even at all, is a waste of en-
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ergy and resources. The EU's past endeavors in the CFSP field have provided the or-
ganization with abundant examples highlighting the importance of efficiency and effec-
tiveness. Under the watch of NATO, the EU will have no excuse for failing again.
There are benefits to working with NATO on this project, but there are also seri-
ous drawbacks. The United States would only approve of an EU security force that was
"clearly secondary to NATO"(Sanger, 2001). So, the RRF is only permitted to engage in
conflicts when the US, or NATO as a whole, does not want to get involved. This se-
verely limits the opportunities that the RRF will have to build experience and contribute
to international peace. Current US President Bush is considering the removal of US and
NATO troops from many areas, creating openings for the RRF when it becomes func-
tional in 2003. But, the next US president may not be so isolationist. Unfortunately,
however, making the new European force a NATO back up was the only way to assuage
the concerns of the five non-EU NATO members that are not being considered in the
next phase of EU enlargement.
Having access to NATO's military assets is also undesirable because it alienates
Russia from becoming involved in the ESDI. NATO originated as a means of countering
Soviet power, and this makes post-Soviet Russia very reluctant to associate with the Alli-
ance on any issue. Russia has expressed interest in working with, and possibly even
contributing to, the RRF. It may decide not to do so because of NATO's control over
which activities the force can undertake.
Developing a European security identity with the assistance of NATO is some-
what ironic because the original purpose of an ESDI was to establish the EU as a military
power, separate from the United States. Now that the EU will be working so closely with
T
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NATO-coordinating policies and sharing information and resources-the EU will con-
tinue to be dependent on non-European actors, and the RRF will merely be a European
pillar within the Alliance.
For now, the European Union will have to rely on NATO in the development of
the planned peacekeeping force, at least until the EU builds its own integrated command
structure. Although working with NATO requires sacrifices in the short-run, such as
Russia's involvement and autonomy from the US, maintaining the suppOli of NATO is
imperative for the success of any European security initiative. Portuguese Foreign Min-
ister Jaime Gama refers to this requirement as an obligation, claiming "it would not be
right ... to neglect the structures that have guaranteed our collective security for over half
a century"(Gama, 2000). Aside from demonstrating loyalty to the organization that still
ensures the defense of many EU nations, the EU's partnership with NATO will contribute
to the eventual strength of the RRF.
Conclusion
Given the global proliferation of internal wars and genocidal violence, the Euro-
pean Union's decision to develop a rapid reaction force for peacekeeping and humanitar-
ian missions could not have come at a better time. Although the Balkan crisis provided
an excellent example of the EU's past failures at military coordination, it is not the only
area in which the RRF could be of assistance. Fighting in Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa, among other places, weigh heavily on the crisis management capacities
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of existing peacekeeping forces. If the RRF is successfully established and managed,
many will undoubtedly appreciate its existence.
Unfortunately, the development of a European security and defense identity is a
slow process. It involves not only security forces, but also a plan for the defense of
Europe. The EU is choosing to remain reliant on NATO and the WEU for defense, and is
moving forward with the RRF to be able to maximize security in Europe and abroad.
The RRF may be set free from the watchful eye of NATO once the European security
force becomes comfortable with crisis management; the EU controls its own extensive
military bureaucracy; and NATO is reassured that the RRF does not endanger the Alli-
ance. At this point, assuming the WEU's and NATO's continued defense guarantee, the
EU will have finally developed an ESDI.
The Europeans' ambitious goal of an ESDI can become a reality as long as French
Defense Minister Alain Richard was correct when he claimed that the EU has "succeeded
in analyzing [its] past shortcomings and hesitations and in learning the lessons from
them"(Isnard, 2000). Maintaining faithful relationships with all of the organizations in-
volved in European security and allowing the past to guide the way for the future will





1 NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is the Cold War military alliance of democratic countries
from Western Europe and North America. The Warsaw Pact was the equivalent security organization for
Eastern Europe and other communist states. It was abolished at the end of the Cold War, whereas NATO
still exists today to deal with violent conflicts in areas that are of concern to NATO members.
2 In 1999, the gross domestic product of the entire EU was $8.5 trillion, compared with $9.3 trillion for the
US and $4.4 trillion for Japan (European Union, 2001). The EU also holds 2 of the 5 permanent UN Secu-
rity Council seats.
3 The Benelux countries are Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
4 The EU-15 are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, Ireland, the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Sweden, and Finland.
5 "Simply defined, European Council is a collective term for the heads of government of EU member states,
their foreign ministers, and the President of the [European] Commission. This small group convenes peri-
odically at short summit meetings and provides strategic policy direction for the EU"(McCormick, 1996,
182).
6 Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, the
United States, and Canada were the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty.
7 The North Atlantic Council consists of representatives from NATO member nations and serves as the
executive power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
8 The countries cunently negotiating EU membership are Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Cyprus,
Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia.
9 In 1996, NATO agreed to the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). CJTFs pennit NATO to
opt out of a mission while allowing its technology and resources to by used by the WED. The purpose of
these WEU-1ed task forces is to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, while avoiding duplication of
effort and institutions. Any CJTF mission must be approved by the North Atlantic Council.
IO The Alliance's integrated command structure coordinates the troops and resources from member states
into coherent military operations.
11 The WEU association consists of Member States, Associate Members, Observers, and Associate Part-
ners.
12 The Balkan crisis did not end with the 1995 NATO bombing. It still continues today between opposing
ethnic and religious groups, despite another NATO bombing in 1999, the removal of the Serbian leader
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